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Abstract.  This article identifies problems with data mining approaches to antiterrorism and 
counterterrorism. 
 
A majority of members of the United States (US) Congress seem to have never had or have lost faith in 
the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s project formerly known as both the Total Information 
Awareness and the Terrorism Information Awareness Program.  Regardless of name, the Program was to 
have identified terrorist-related concatenations of data and led to antiterrorism and counterterrorism 
acts to meet the threat depicted by the data through interpretive rules.  Public rationales for never 
having or losing faith in the Program have varied not only in substance but in relevance to the purposes 
of antiterrorism and counterterrorism. 
 
One significant rationale bears on real and putative violations of civil rights.  The degrees of freedom for 
US and other citizens given up by collecting, analyzing, maintaining, and acting on information is 
deemed too egregious a phenomenon to be counterbalanced by antiterrorism and counterterrorism 
benefit. 
 
A related rationale bears on the threat of human rights violations.  Here the Program’s data and 
predictive statements could be used to an unacceptable degree in effecting noxious acts proscribed by 
law against individuals who turn out to be innocent and guilty of terrorism operations or support. 
 
A third rationale bears on the sophisticated reconnaissance, surveillance, and research capabilities of 
formal and informal terrorist networks, organizations, and partially overlapping social entities.  The 
problem here is at least threefold.  The interpretive rules of the Program can be identified.  Acts leading 
to a terrorist operations can be chosen and effected to “fly under the radar” of the rules.  And this two-
step procedure can be repeated as new rules are developed, identified, and avoided. 
 
A fourth rationale bears on the constraints of empirical science.  Given that data mining cannot address 
all data and that interpretive rules are subject to the vulnerabilities of inductive—and, to a lesser 
degree, deductive—logic, antiterrorism and counterterrorism benefit may not be obtained.  A related 
belief can be characterized by the seemingly magical properties attributed to a science of reliable and 
valid prediction of extremely low probability social events. 
 
A fifth rationale bears on the social transformation of knowledge.  An example of this transformation is 
that the speed with which a specific piece of information changes its terrorism-related meaning as 
perceived by various observers may be faster than the speed with which reliable and valid interpretive 
rules can be devised for the Program. 
 
Public oppositional discourse on the Program has been and continues to be weighted much more along 
the lines of civil and human rights violations than on the Program’s security, reliability, and validity.  And 
this discourse continues to create a huge misperception that opposition to the Program will lead the US 
Government (USG) to fight terrorism with one hand tied behind its back.  Instead, it may well be that 
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opposition is only keeping the USG from having a weapon in hand that would not work.  In this regard, 
the change from Total to Terrorism in the Program’s Title may be not only an exemplar of 
propagandistic rhetoric but also an admission that total can’t be accomplished and, regardless, can’t 
work.  (See Campbell, C., Williams, B., & Gilgen, D.  (2002). Is social capital a useful conceptual tool for 
exploring community level influences on HIV infection? An exploratory case study from South Africa. 
AIDS Care, 14, 41-54; Drobics, M., Bodenhofer, U., & Winiwarter, W.  (2002). Mining clusters and 
corresponding interpretable descriptions -- A three-stage approach. Expert Systems: International 
Journal of Knowledge Engineering & Neural Networks, 19, 224-234; Markoff, J.  (May 21, 2003).  Experts 
say technology is widely disseminated inside and outside military.  The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com; Menczer, F.  (2003). Complementing search engines with online web mining 
agents. Decision Support Systems, 35, 195-212.) (Keywords: Data Mining, Profiling, Terrorism.) 
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